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Abstract: Although the US airline industry began 2001 with 24 consecutive 
profitable quarters, including net profits in 2000 totaling $7.9 billion, the 
impact of the 9/11 event on the industry was substantial. Whereas the 
recession that began in early 2001 signaled the end of profitability, the 9/11 
terrorist attacks pushed the industry into financial crisis after air travel 
dropped 20% over the September–December 2001 period compared to the 
same period in 2000. Given the decline in domestic air travel, an important 
question is whether the detrimental impact of the attacks was temporary or 
permanent. That is, did airline travel return to the trend that existed prior to 
the terrorist attacks? There are theoretical reasons to the believe that it 
would not. Economists have long viewed travel-mode choices as the outcome 
of a comparison of opportunity costs and benefits. Thus, anything that 
permanently raises the opportunity cost of travel, holding benefits constant, 
should reduce the level of travel volume. To determine whether air travel was 
permanently reduced, we use econometric and time-series forecasting models 
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to generate a counter-factual forecast of air travel volume in the absence of 
the terrorist attacks. These dynamic forecasts are compared to actual air 
travel levels to determine the impact of the terrorist attacks. The findings 
suggest that domestic air travel did not return to the levels that would have 
existed in the absence of the attack. 
I. Introduction 
The US airline industry began the year 2001 with 24 consecutive 
profitable quarters, and net profits in 2000 totaled $7.9 billion. From 
1990 through to the end of 2000, passenger travel volume rose at an 
average rate of 3.6% per year. Whereas the recession that began in 
the first quarter of 2001 signaled the end of profitability, the 9/11 
terrorist attacks pushed the industry into financial crisis. Net 
reductions in profits totaled $3.2 billion in the third quarter of 2001, 
and $4.4 billion for all of 2001.1 Indeed, these losses would have been 
significantly higher had the Congress not quickly passed the Air 
Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act in September 2001, which 
provided $5 billion in emergency assistance to the airlines.  
 
To understand the magnitude of the impact on passenger air 
travel, we evaluate recent trends in travel volume. Figure 1 shows the 
revenue passenger miles (RPM) for domestic air travel from 1989 to 
2002.2 As can be seen in the diagram, the impact on air travel volume 
was dramatic, with the volume of air travel down 31.6% in September 
2001 compared to September 2000. The grounding of the fleet for 
three days in the wake of the attacks was followed by minimal travel 
activity during the latter half of the month. Over the September to 
December 2001 period, the decline was 20.2% compared to the same 
period the previous year and the overall volume for 2001 finished 
below the 2000 levels by 12.1%.  
 
Even in light of the decline in domestic airline travel, an 
important question is whether the detrimental impact of the attacks 
was temporary or permanent. That is, has airline travel returned to the 
trend that existed prior to the terrorist attacks? There are reasons to 
believe that it has not. Economists have long viewed travel-mode 
choices as the outcome of a comparison of opportunity costs and 
benefits. Thus, anything that permanently raises the opportunity cost 
of travel, holding benefits constant, should reduce the optimal level of 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Applied Economics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (March 2006): pg. 363-370. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge) and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge) does 
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
3 
 
travel volume. Since the time cost of travel has risen as a consequence 
of additional airport security measures, this should reduce the 
likelihood of some trips by air. Hence, if these costs are now 
permanently higher, optimizing travellers will switch to other modes of 
travel for certain flights, especially those covering relatively short 
distances. 
 
To determine whether air travel was permanently reduced, one 
must consider how the airline industry would have fared had the 9/11 
attacks never occurred. That is, one must generate a counter-factual 
forecast of air travel volume in the absence of the terrorist attacks. 
This approach has been employed in a recent study to consider the 
impact of casino gambling on local employment growth. Specifically, 
Garrett (2004) develops forecasting models of employment growth for 
several counties in Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi and Missouri. He then 
generates predictions of the counter-factual employment growth in the 
absence of casino development. This forecast is then compared to the 
actual employment levels to derive the true impact of casinos on local 
employment. We take a similar approach in this study. After 
developing both econometric and time-series forecasting models of air 
travel volume using pre-9/11 data, we generate dynamic forecasts of 
air travel in the post-9/11 period. These data are then compared to 
actual air travel levels to determine the impact of the terrorist attacks. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
develops the theoretical model, Section III develops the empirical 
models used to generate the counter-factual forecasts and presents 
the empirical findings. The final section contains concluding remarks. 
II. Theoretical model 
Moses and Williamson (1963) describe a modal choice model 
applied to commuting behaviour that focuses on the differential net 
income that can be earned from two alternative forms of commuting.3 
We generalize this framework to consider the issue of intercity travel 
for either business or vacation travelers. Let us first consider the 
business traveler. Assume that an individual's net income (Y) earned 
for the company is a function of the billable wage rate for the 
employees services (w), the total time spent working (e), and the out-
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of-pocket cost of travel (c). The total time spent working (e) is then 
equal to the stock of time (s) minus the time spent traveling (t) minus 
leisure time (L). This gives a value of net income for air travel, A, as:  
 
 
 
Assume the stock of time is fixed at s o, and the amount of leisure 
required by the worker is also a constant (L o) which gives:  
 
 
 
for air travel, and  
 
 
 
for travel by the alternative travel mode (e.g., travel by car). We then 
define the difference in net income resulting from these two alternative 
travel modes as:  
 
 
 
Equation 4 shows that the relative income depends on the relative 
difference in the implicit value of time spent traveling (w*(tC  − tA )) 
and the difference in out of pocket travel expenses (cC − cA ). Assuming 
the implicit costs are solely a function of the wage (i.e. ignoring the 
disutility of time spent traveling), then air travel will be chosen if Z is 
positive, and travel by car will be chosen if Z is negative. If Z is zero, 
the traveler be indifferent between the two alternative travel modes.  
 
We can now evaluate the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
(define the dummy variable X = 0 in the pre-9/11 period and X = 1 in 
the post 9/11 period) on the choice of travel mode. The attacks 
resulted in an increase in the amount of time to travel by air (ΔtA/ΔX >  
0), as new security measures were put in place. Simultaneously, the 
airlines dropped fares in an attempt to entice travelers to fly (ΔcA/ΔX 
 < 0). Assuming that any changes in the volume of automobile traffic 
were insufficient to significantly change travel times (tC), the impact of 
the attacks on Z are solely a function of the impacts on tA and cA . This 
leaves the impact on Z ambiguous since:  
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If as a result of the 9/11 attacks, the increase in the monetary 
value of the implicit cost of time spent traveling (−w*( ΔtA/ΔX)) 
exceeds the lower out-of-pocket expense from the fare reductions 
(−ΔcA/ΔX) by a large enough margin (i.e. by a margin big enough to 
switch Z from positive to negative), then travelers will switch from air 
travel to auto travel along that route. On the other hand, if the 
increment in travel times was small vis-á-vis the out-of-pocket cost 
reduction from lower fares, then Z would increase which would 
increase the likelihood that a traveler would travel by air. 
 
This analysis is too simplistic on at least one dimension. It 
incorrectly concludes that there is no disutility associated with travel 
via either mode of travel. Hence, changes in the implicit cost depended 
solely on changes in travel times, since the wage rate was assumed to 
be a constant, independent of travel mode. However, one can 
generalize the implicit value to depend not only on the monetary value 
of one's time, but also the disutility associated with the specific form of 
travel. Thus, redefining w as the monetized value of the disutility 
associated with travel, it is reasonable to expect that wA  ≠ wC , 
especially in the post-9/11 period. Thus, the difference in net income 
becomes:  
 
 
 
Re-evaluating the effect of the 9/11 event on the modal choice 
decision gives:  
 
 
 
From Equation 7 it can be seen that the a priori sign expectation on Z 
is still unknown, although the likelihood of Z falling sufficiently to 
switch its' sign from positive to negative, increases since ΔwA/ΔX > 0, 
and hence there are now two negative terms in the expression. 
 
The model as described in Equation 6 easily generalizes to the 
modal choices of vacation travellers. It would not be surprising to find 
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that the implicit value of time (i.e. wA , wC ) differs from that of the 
business traveller for several reasons. First, the wage paid to the 
worker need not be the same as the billable hours to the employer. 
Second, leisure time is typically valued at a fraction of the wage paid 
to workers whereas time spent travelling for business would be valued 
at the full wage. Finally, one would expect any disutility associated 
with travel time to depend nonlinearly on the total amount of leisure 
time available for the pleasure trip (i.e., wA (L o), wC (L o)).4 
Nonetheless, even with these differences, the insights derived from 
Equation 7 remain intact.  
 
Summarizing, we assume that the effects of the 9/11 attacks 
were to:  
 
1.  increase the travel time by air by more than they did the travel 
times for other forms of travel;5  
2.  reduce the out-of-pocket expenses for airline travel more 
substantially than they did for other forms of transportation; 
3.  increase the disutility associated with flying by more than they 
did for other forms of travel. 
 
Based on these assumptions, we conclude that the impacts of the 
terrorist attacks on air travel are:  
 
1.  Theoretically ambiguous if the magnitudes of the various terms 
in Equation 7 are not established. 
2.  More likely to be detrimental to the decision to fly, the larger is 
(−ΔwA/ΔX*tA − wA(ΔtA/ΔX)) vis-á-vis (−ΔcA/ΔX). 
 
Thus, if fares eventually return to pre-9/11 levels, and if the disutility 
associated with flying also returns to pre-9/11 levels, the total volume 
of air travel will not return to its previous level so long as the 
additional security required increases the time necessary to fly. That 
is, some trips that once generated positive Z values will now generate 
negative values, causing those travelers to switch to alternative forms 
of travel. 
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III. Empirical Model 
To test the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the US domestic 
passenger airline industry, we first develop two forecasting models. 
The models considered are a structural demand model, and a VAR 
model. For each model, dynamic ex-post forecasts are generated over 
a 16-month period prior to the attacks to test the forecast 
performance. These models are then re-estimated and dynamically 
forecast over the period 2001:09–2003:016 so as to project the path 
of sales, had the 9/11 attacks not taken place. The forecasts are 
compared with actual travel volumes over the period to ascertain 
whether the impact of the attacks appears to be temporary or 
permanent.  
Structural demand model 
There are a number of studies that investigate demand for air 
travel. For example, Battersby and Oczkowski (2001) examine 
domestic air travel in Australia, and include a number of determinants 
including the price, price of substitutes, income as proxied by 
industrial production and a seasonal demand dummy. In a study of 
charter air travel in Greece, Karlaftis and Papastavrou (1998) consider 
a similar set of determinants and also include a lagged dependent 
variable. Our structural demand model, which is given by Equation 8, 
builds off both of these earlier studies.  
 
 
 
We regress travel volume as measured by revenue passenger miles 
(RPM) on the real price (PREAL), lagged RPM, and numerous demand 
shifters. Among the demand shifters included in the model are the real 
price of substitute forms of travel as measured by the CPI for non-air 
travel divided by the general CPI (PREALSUBST), the unemployment rate 
(UE), personal income (Income), and three dummy variables for the 
months of the first Gulf War (GW). Both UE and Income are included 
to capture the transitory and more permanent aspects of economic 
activity on the demand for air travel, respectively. All variables used in 
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the model, their data sources and their descriptive statistics are fully 
described in Table 1. 
 
With the exception of the unemployment rate, and the Gulf War 
dummy variables, all remaining variables are measured in log form. A 
stationarity test (augmented Dickey–Fuller) on the dependent variable 
(revenue passenger miles) reveals that the series is non-stationary in 
levels, but stationary in the first difference.7 Thus, all continuous 
variables, with the exception of Income have been seasonal 
differenced to render them stationary, which expresses the model in 
growth form (year over year rates of change). Personal income is 
already in seasonally adjusted form, and thus seasonal differencing is 
not necessary. Since PREAL is expected to be endogenously determined, 
Equation 8 is estimated using two-stage least squares, with lagged 
variables used as instruments. The regression findings are reported in 
Table 2.  
 
The model explains approximately 53.3% of the variation in the 
differenced log of RPM. Moreover, all the coefficients have the 
anticipated sign when there is a sign prediction. As expected, the price 
and sales volume are inversely related to one another whereas the 
opposite is true for lagged income suggesting that air travel is a 
normal good. Growth rates in RPM decline with positive changes in the 
unemployment rate, but air travel does not appear to respond 
significantly to the real price of non-air travel. Finally, there was a 
significant decline in the growth of RPM in February and March of the 
first Gulf War, and the rate of change of RPM shows some persistence, 
as it is positively related to its one-month lag. 
VAR model 
A vector autoregression (VAR) model was estimated over the 
same time period as the structural demand model. The variables of the 
model (ln(RPM), ln(PREAL ), ln(PREALSUBST ), UE, and ln(Income)) were 
tested for the existence of cointegration using the method described 
by Pesaran et al. (2001). Following that procedure, an autoregressive 
distributed-lag (ARDL) model with no trend and an unrestricted 
intercept is estimated, and a joint test of significance was performed 
on the coefficients of the once-lagged variables listed above. The 
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computed statistic is 2.27, which falls below the lower bound of the 
test at the 5% level of significance, implying the variables are not part 
of a cointegrated system. Therefore, the once-lagged variables are 
removed from the model, resulting in a VAR-type equation, given by  
 
 
 
As indicated, the equation contains two lags of the stationary form of 
the variables used in the structural demand model (except for the 
unemployment rate) and includes dummy variables for the first Gulf 
War. The regression findings are reported in Table 3. Similar to the 
structural demand model, there is evidence of persistence in the year-
over-year growth of RPM. The sum of the coefficient estimates of PREAL 
and PREALSUBST are of the expected sign (negative, positive) and are 
significant with p-values of approximately 0.14, similar to that of the 
unemployment rate. As was the case in the structural demand results, 
air travel can be considered a normal good, and the first Gulf War had 
some detrimental impact on the growth of airline travel. 
Ex-post forecasting 
The goal of the model development is to generate dynamic 
forecasts over the period 2001:09–2002:12 and then compare those 
counter-factual forecasts with the actual levels of RPM over that 
period. To test forecast accuracy, we re-estimate both models over a 
shortened time-period (1989:01–2000:04) and then dynamically 
forecast over the next 16 months leading up to September 2001 (i.e., 
2000:05–2001:08).8 Both models do a good job of projecting the level 
of RPM over the 16 months immediately preceding the terrorist 
attacks. A plot of the actual level of RPM against the forecasts of the 
two alternative models is shown in Fig. 2.  
 
For the structural model, the mean average prediction error 
(MAPE) was 1.2% and it was 2.1% for the VAR model. In addition, 
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both models did a reasonable job of capturing directional accuracy (i.e. 
the predicted direction was correct for 12 of 16 months) as well as 
turning points in the data (i.e. it captured four of seven turning 
points). Both models also did a good job of predicting the variation in 
the data, as reflected in correlations between actual and predicted of 
r = 0.976 for the VAR model, and r = 0.959 for the structural model. 
There was no consistent evidence of bias in either model. The 
structural model under-predicted RPM by an error of more than 1% in 
5 of 16 months, and over-predicted air travel by an error in excess of 
1% in 7 of 16 months. By comparison, the VAR model under-predicted 
RPM by an error of 1% or more just 2 of 16 months, and over-
predicted air travel by more than 1% in 8 of 16 months. No individual 
error reached 5%.9 Since both models perform reasonably, one may 
consider simply choosing one of the forecasting approaches. However, 
Bates and Granger (1969) suggest that even if one model is inferior in 
forecast performance, that a combination forecast may generate 
forecasts with lower standard errors than those of individual forecasts. 
To derive the weights for the individual forecasts, we employ a 
technique developed by Granger and Ramanathan (1984) in which the 
two models are estimated and in-sample fit values are derived for the 
Structural Demand (fSD ) and VAR (fVAR ) respectively. Linear 
regression is used to determine the forecast weights (β1, β2), as shown 
in Equation 10.  
 
 
 
The regression findings are reported in Equation 11  
 
 
 
As can be seen, both weights are statistically significant, and a Wald 
test reveals that the sum of the weights is not significantly different 
from unity. Both the structural demand model and the VAR model are 
used to generate dynamic forecasts over the period 2001:09–2002:12, 
and then the joint forecasts are generated using Equation 11. The ex-
ante forecasts are plotted against the actual RPM in Fig. 3 and the 
percentage error is reported in Table 4.  
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Not surprisingly, the forecasting model substantially over-
predicts actual RPM in the months immediately following the terrorist 
attacks given the dramatic decline in demand for air travel that only 
slowly ameliorated. The over-prediction is 54.1% in September 2001, 
and it steadily falls throughout the remainder of the year. The lowest 
level of over-prediction is 9.4% in March 2002. Over the period April 
2002–August 2002, the model over-prediction is in the range of 12.8–
16%. However, at the one year anniversary of the attacks, the level of 
over-prediction spikes to 24.4%, and remains above 20% in October, 
increasing to nearly 31% in November10 before settling back into the 
12% range in December 2002.  
 
One might be tempted to conclude that the over-prediction in 
the ex ante period is simply a continuation of the tendency found in 
the ex post testing of the model. While both the structural demand 
and the VAR models had a tendency to over-predict, the magnitude of 
over-prediction was minor. The MAPE was between 1.2% and 2.1% 
over the 16-month period immediately preceding the 9/11 attacks, 
and at no point did it exceed 5%. In contrast, over the 16 months 
following the attacks, the MAPE was 21.3% and it never fell below 9%. 
IV. Conclusions 
It is clear that the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks had a 
significant short-run impact on the domestic air travel industry, and 
several airlines were pushed to the brink of bankruptcy as a result of 
the reduced demand. Whereas the swift response of the Federal 
Government in September of 2001 averted a collapse of the industry, 
the research presented in this paper suggests that the detrimental 
impacts of the attacks were not temporary. Rather they are likely to 
persist. Such a finding is consistent with optimizing behaviour on the 
part of travellers, both business and pleasure, who experienced 
increased opportunity cost of travel. Thus, as long as the enhanced 
airport security measures necessitate earlier passenger arrival times 
than existed prior to the attacks, revenue passenger miles will be 
expected to remain below the levels that would have existed in the 
absence of 9/11. 
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Notes 
1 Federal Aviation Administration, Aviation Policy and Plans, Aviation Industry 
Overview, FY 2000 and Aviation Industry Overview, FY 2001. 
2 Revenue passenger miles represent the product of the number of revenue 
paying passengers and the number of miles flown by those 
passengers. These data are derived from the Air Transport Association. 
3 Moses and Williamson (1963) focused primarily on the choice between 
commuter rail versus automobile commuters, or alternatively the 
choice of route taken and tolls incurred for automobile commuters. 
4 One might argue that there is another important difference between 
business and pleasure travellers. That is, business travellers may be 
unconcerned with the out-of-pocket expenses associated with the trip 
assuming business travel is covered by the employer. However, this 
logic is flawed. We assume that it is the employer, rather than the 
traveller who makes the travel decision. The employer considers the 
full opportunity cost of travel when making the modal choice. 
5 We have compared air travel to automobile travel, yet it can be generalized 
to rail travel as well. The enhanced security measures for train travel 
did not increase the time necessary to travel by rail as much as they 
did for air travel. 
6 We eliminate the period beyond 2003:01 so as to avoid any confounding 
influence brought on by the US war in Iraq. 
7 The critical value of the ADF statistic for the revenue passenger miles, in 
level form is t  = 2.88, and the actual value is 0.984, and hence we 
accept the null of a unit root. After first differencing, the value of the 
ADF is t = 5.13 which exceeds the critical value of t  = 2.88. Given the 
strong seasonality in the data, we also test for stationarity in the 
seasonal difference. Again, we find that the revenue passenger miles 
series is stationary in the first seasonal difference (i.e. with no 
consecutive differencing). 
8 The models were essentially unchanged when the estimation range was 
shortened with one exception. Although the income coefficient 
remained positively signed in the structural demand model, it became 
statistically insignificant. 
9 An ARIMA model of the year-over-year change of RPM was also estimated 
for 1989:01–2000:04 (with an AR term at lag 1 and MA term at lag 
12) and ex post forecasts for 2000:05–2001:08 generated. They are in 
line with those reported above; the MAPE is 1.5%, and that model 
over-predicts air travel by more than 1% nine times while it under-
predicts RPM by more than 1% on just two occasions. 
10 Note that the substantial increase in over-prediction in November 2002 may 
reflect the fact that the Thanksgiving holiday weekend extends into 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Applied Economics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (March 2006): pg. 363-370. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge) and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge) does 
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
13 
 
December 2002. This would be consistent with the finding of a much 
smaller over-prediction in December 2002. This pattern is also 
observed in earlier years where this phenomenon occurred. 
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Fig. 2. Ex-post forecast performance (2000:04–2001:08) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Ex-ante forecast performance (2000:04–2001:08) 
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Table 1: Variable Name and Definition, Data Source, Descriptive Statistics 
and Predicted Sign 
 
Table 2: Structural Demand Model of Revenue Passenger Miles 1989:01—
2001:08 
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Table 3: Vector Autoregression Model of Revenue Passenger Miles 1989:01—
2001:08 
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Table 4. Actual versus forecast RPMt  
 
